FEMINIST THEORIES
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 581-621
Feminist Theory – the extension of feminism into theoretical, or philosophical discourse, it aims to understand the nature of gender inequality. It examines women's social roles and lived experience, and feminist politics in a variety of fields, such as anthropology and sociology, psychoanalysis, economics, literary criticism, and philosophy. While generally providing a critique of social relations, much of feminist theory also focuses on analyzing gender inequality and the promotion of women's rights, interests, and issues. Themes explored in feminism include art history, and contemporary art, aesthetics, discrimination, stereotyping, objectification (especially sexual objectification), oppression, and patriarchy.
Dorothy Smith – In recognition of her contributions in "transformation of sociology", and for extending boundaries of "feminist standpoint theory" to "include race, class, and gender", Dr. Smith received numerous awards from American Sociological Association, including the American Sociological Association's Career of Distinguished Scholarship Award (1999) and the Jessie Bernard Award for Feminist Sociology (1993). In recognition of her scholarship, she also received two awards from the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association: the Outstanding Contribution Award (1990) and the John Porter Award for her book "The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology." (1990).
Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for People (2005), Mothering for Schooling -- with Alison Griffith (2004), Writing the Social: Critique, Theory, and Investigations (1999), The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of Knowledge (1990), Texts, Facts, and Femininity: Exploring the Relations of Ruling (1990), The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (1987), Feminism and Marxism: A Place to Begin, A Way to Go (1977), Women Look at Psychiarty: I'm Not Mad, I'm Angry -- Collection edited by Smith and David (1975) Press Gang Publishing.
Relations of ruling – includes not only forms such as “bureaucracy, administration, management, professional organization and interpenetrate, and coordinate” them. Smith maintains that behind and within the “apparently neutral and impersonal rationality of the ruling apparatus” is concealed a “male subtext.” Women are “excluded from the practices of power within textually mediated relations of ruling.” Thus, for instance, official psychiatric evaluations replace the individual’s actual lived experience with a means for interpreting it; the individual becomes a case history, a type, a disease, a syndrome, and a treatment possibility (587).
Bifurcation of consciousness – Smith uses this term to refer to a separation or split between the world as you actually experience it and the dominant view to which you must adapt (e.g., a masculine point of view). The notion of bifurcation of consciousness underscores that subordinate groups are conditioned to view the world from the perspective of the dominant group, since the perspective of the latter is embedded in the institutions and practices of that world, while the dominant group, on the other hand, enjoys the privilege of remaining oblivious to the worldview of the Other, or subordinate group, since the Other is fully expected to accommodate them. The “governing mode” of the professions, then. Creates a bifurcation of consciousness in the actor” “It establishes two modes of knowing, experiencing, and acting—one located in the body and in the space that it occupies and moves into, the other passing beyond it (587).”
Institutional Ethnography – – is a method of elucidating and examining the relationship between everyday activities and experiences and larger institutional imperatives. Interestingly, the very term “institutional ethnography” explicitly couples and emphasis on structures of power (“institutions”) which the microlevel practices that make up everyday life (“ethnography”). Smith’s point, of course, is that it is in microlevel, everyday practices at the level of the individual that collective, hierarchical patterns of social structure are experienced, shaped, and reaffirmed. For instance, in one passage you will read, Smith explains how the seemingly benign, everday act of walking her dog actually reaffirms the class system. As Smith “keeps an eye on her dog” so that it does its business on some lawns as opposed to others, she is, in fact, “observing some of the niceties of different forms of property ownership” (renters versus owners); she is participating in the existing relations of ruling (588).
Standpoint Theory – Smith uses the notion of standpoint to emphasize that what one knows is affected by where one stands (one’s subjective position) in society. We being from the world as we actually experience it, and what we know of the world and the “other” is conditional upon the location. Smith’s argument is not that we cannot look at the world in any way other than our given standpoint. Rather, her point is that (1) no one can have complete, objective knowledge; (2) no two people have exactly the same standpoint; and (3) we must not take the standpoint from which we speak for granted. Instead, we must recognize it, be reflexive about it, and problematize it. Our Situated, everyday experience should serve as a “point of entry” of investigation (585).
Patricia Hill Collins – Collins draws on black women's experiences and voices to explain concepts that have been obscured institutionally, philosophically, and ideologically. Collins's interdisciplinary methodology employs a "both/and" analytical approach to domination and subordination. Collins rejects oppositional thought because "either/or thinking categorizes people, things, and ideas in terms of their differences from one another" which requires objectification and subordination.
Another Kind of Public Education: Race, the Media, Schools, and Democratic Possibilities, ISBN 0807000183, 2009, From Black Power to Hip Hop: Racism, Nationalism, and Feminism, ISBN 1-59213-092-5, 2006, Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism, ISBN 0-415-93099-5, 2005, Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice, ISBN 0-8166-2377-5, 1998, Race, Class and Gender: An Anthology, ISBN 0-534-52879-1, co-edited w/ Margaret Andersen, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment, ISBN 0-415-92484-7, 1990, 2000.
Standpoint Epistemology – Collins philosophic viewpoint that what one knows is affected by the standpoint (or position) one has in society. Collins extends the critical/phenomenological feminist ideas of Dorothy Smith by illuminating the particular epistemological standpoint of black women. Yet, Collins does not merely add the empirical dimension of “race” to Smith’s feminist, critical/phenomenological framework. Rather, taking a poststructural/postmodern turn, Collins emphasized the “interlocking” nature of the wide variety of statuses—for example, race, class, gender, nationality, sexual orientation—that make up our stand of domination, there are also potential sites of resistance (607).
The group or community level of the cultural context created by race, class, and gender is vital to Collin’s conceptualization of Black Feminist Thought, which like all specialized thought reflects the interest and standpoint of its creators. Collins locates black feminist thought in the unique literary traditions forged by black women such as Bell Hooks, Audre Lorde, and Alice Walker, as well as in the everyday experience of ordinary black women. In addition, black feminist through is rooted in black women’s intellectual tradition nurtured by black women’s community. Collins maintains: When white men control the knowledge validation process, both political criteria (contextual creditability and evaluation of knowledge claims) can work to suppress Black feminist thought. Therefore, black women are more likely to choose an alternative epistemology for assessing knowledge claims, one using different standards that are consistent with black women’s criteria for substantiated knowledge and with our criteria for methodology adequacy (608).
Matrix of Domination – to underscore that one’s position in society is made up of multiple contiguous standpoints rather than just one essentialist standpoint. Thus in contrast to earlier critical accounts that assume that power operates form the top down by forcing and controlling unwilling victims to bend to the will of more powerful superiors. Collins asserts that “depending on the context and individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed… Each individual derives varying amounts of penalty and provided from the multiple systems of oppression which frame everyone’s lives (608).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/smith~collins.doc
Saturday, January 23, 2010
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
C Wright Mills/Jurgen Habermas
CRITICAL THEORY
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 409; Mills 1-20; Appelrouth & Edles 719-752
Critical Theory – the examination and critique of society and culture, drawing from knowledge across the social sciences and humanities. The term has two quite different meanings with different origins and histories, one originating in sociology and the other in literary criticism. This has led to the very literal use of 'critical theory' as an umbrella term to describe theoretical critique.
C. Wright Mills – There has long been debate over Mills' overall intellectual outlook. Mills is often seen as a "closet Marxist" because of his emphasis on social classes and their roles in historical progress and attempt to keep Marxist traditions alive in social theory. Just as often, however, others argue that Mills more closely identified with the work of Max Weber, whom many sociologists interpret as an exemplar of sophisticated (and intellectually adequate) anti-Marxism and modern liberalism.
Jurgen Habermas – Habermas's works resonate within the traditions of Kant and the Enlightenment and of democratic socialism through his emphasis on the potential for transforming the world and arriving at a more humane, just, and egalitarian society through the realization of the human potential for reason, in part through discourse ethics. While Habermas has stated that the Enlightenment is an "unfinished project," he argues it should be corrected and complemented, not discarded. In this he distances himself from the Frankfurt School, criticizing it, as well as much of postmodernist thought, for excessive pessimism, misdirected radicalism and exaggerations.
Habermas conceives of the lifeworld as a prereflexive framework of background assumptions, a “network of shared meanings that individuals draw from to construct identities, to negotiate situational definitions, or to create social solidarity.” It consists of taken-for-granted cultural know-how, customs, and norms through which we are able to construct common understandings of our social world. In addition, the lifeworld provides for the socialization of society’s members and the internalization of norms and values essential to the stability of the social order (721).
Habermas maintains that his notion of the lifeworld helps correct Marx’s reductive, one-sided theory of society. According to Habermas, Marx and his successors failed to recognize the significance of the symbolic and communicative domains of society, opting instead to emphasize the role of economic production and property relations both in generating conditions of exploitation and in sparking the eventual communist revolution. Nevertheless, to avoid developing his own one-sided, and thus incomplete, theory, Habermas introduces the notion of the “system” to address some of the concerns that Marx had earlier studied. The system comprises a society’s political and economic structures that are responsible for the organization of power relations and the production and distribution of material resources. As societies evolve, both the state and the economy develop their own formal structure and mechanisms for self-organization. Habermas calls these organizational mechanisms steering media and argues that two primary forms emerge: power and money (721).
As the complexity, power and differentiation of the system grows, it eventually becomes sealed off from the lifeworld and ultimately comes to engulf it. In one of his more famous expressions, Habermas describes this process as the colonization of the lifeworld. In this process, system steering media (money and power) and technical/instrumental logic come to replace the consensual negotiation of shared meanings as the foundation for social integration and the reproduction of the lifeworld. The result is a “totally administered” society in which social relationships are increasingly mediated by power and money and the interpersonal debates and discussions within the lifeworld come to have less and less impact on the constitution of the system. Thus, while modern societies have witnessed a phenomenal expansion of productive capacity and material wealth, they have yet to fulfill the promise of the Enlightenment (723).
communicative action – a process in which individuals come to mutual understand and consensus through open, no coercive debate and discussion freed from the corrosive effects of money, power, and manipulation. Encompassing the other forms of rationality and addressing simultaneously the worlds of objective, social and subjective experience, communicative action embodies a critical stance that allows for the negotiation of shared meanings, the coordination of action, and the socialization of individuals. In the process, communicative action—itself an outgrowth of the evolutionary rationalization of the lifeworld—reproduces the lifeworld by transmitting the cultural stock of knowledge, integrating individuals into the community, and securing the formation of personal and social identities (724).
the public sphere – is composed of an array of social spaces where, ideally, private individuals can publicly congregate and freely debate political, ethnical, and social issues in a noncoercive and “undistorted” manner. The public sphere is not an institution, an organization, or a system; rather it is:
a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions. Like the lifeworld as a whole, so too, the public sphere is reproduced through communicative action (725).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/mills~habermas.doc
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 409; Mills 1-20; Appelrouth & Edles 719-752
Critical Theory – the examination and critique of society and culture, drawing from knowledge across the social sciences and humanities. The term has two quite different meanings with different origins and histories, one originating in sociology and the other in literary criticism. This has led to the very literal use of 'critical theory' as an umbrella term to describe theoretical critique.
C. Wright Mills – There has long been debate over Mills' overall intellectual outlook. Mills is often seen as a "closet Marxist" because of his emphasis on social classes and their roles in historical progress and attempt to keep Marxist traditions alive in social theory. Just as often, however, others argue that Mills more closely identified with the work of Max Weber, whom many sociologists interpret as an exemplar of sophisticated (and intellectually adequate) anti-Marxism and modern liberalism.
Jurgen Habermas – Habermas's works resonate within the traditions of Kant and the Enlightenment and of democratic socialism through his emphasis on the potential for transforming the world and arriving at a more humane, just, and egalitarian society through the realization of the human potential for reason, in part through discourse ethics. While Habermas has stated that the Enlightenment is an "unfinished project," he argues it should be corrected and complemented, not discarded. In this he distances himself from the Frankfurt School, criticizing it, as well as much of postmodernist thought, for excessive pessimism, misdirected radicalism and exaggerations.
Habermas conceives of the lifeworld as a prereflexive framework of background assumptions, a “network of shared meanings that individuals draw from to construct identities, to negotiate situational definitions, or to create social solidarity.” It consists of taken-for-granted cultural know-how, customs, and norms through which we are able to construct common understandings of our social world. In addition, the lifeworld provides for the socialization of society’s members and the internalization of norms and values essential to the stability of the social order (721).
Habermas maintains that his notion of the lifeworld helps correct Marx’s reductive, one-sided theory of society. According to Habermas, Marx and his successors failed to recognize the significance of the symbolic and communicative domains of society, opting instead to emphasize the role of economic production and property relations both in generating conditions of exploitation and in sparking the eventual communist revolution. Nevertheless, to avoid developing his own one-sided, and thus incomplete, theory, Habermas introduces the notion of the “system” to address some of the concerns that Marx had earlier studied. The system comprises a society’s political and economic structures that are responsible for the organization of power relations and the production and distribution of material resources. As societies evolve, both the state and the economy develop their own formal structure and mechanisms for self-organization. Habermas calls these organizational mechanisms steering media and argues that two primary forms emerge: power and money (721).
As the complexity, power and differentiation of the system grows, it eventually becomes sealed off from the lifeworld and ultimately comes to engulf it. In one of his more famous expressions, Habermas describes this process as the colonization of the lifeworld. In this process, system steering media (money and power) and technical/instrumental logic come to replace the consensual negotiation of shared meanings as the foundation for social integration and the reproduction of the lifeworld. The result is a “totally administered” society in which social relationships are increasingly mediated by power and money and the interpersonal debates and discussions within the lifeworld come to have less and less impact on the constitution of the system. Thus, while modern societies have witnessed a phenomenal expansion of productive capacity and material wealth, they have yet to fulfill the promise of the Enlightenment (723).
communicative action – a process in which individuals come to mutual understand and consensus through open, no coercive debate and discussion freed from the corrosive effects of money, power, and manipulation. Encompassing the other forms of rationality and addressing simultaneously the worlds of objective, social and subjective experience, communicative action embodies a critical stance that allows for the negotiation of shared meanings, the coordination of action, and the socialization of individuals. In the process, communicative action—itself an outgrowth of the evolutionary rationalization of the lifeworld—reproduces the lifeworld by transmitting the cultural stock of knowledge, integrating individuals into the community, and securing the formation of personal and social identities (724).
the public sphere – is composed of an array of social spaces where, ideally, private individuals can publicly congregate and freely debate political, ethnical, and social issues in a noncoercive and “undistorted” manner. The public sphere is not an institution, an organization, or a system; rather it is:
a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions. Like the lifeworld as a whole, so too, the public sphere is reproduced through communicative action (725).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/mills~habermas.doc
Peter Blau
EXCHANGE THEORY
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 454-473
Professor at the University of Chicago then Columbia University. President of American Sociological Association 1973. Senior Fellow at Kings College, Fellow of the National Academy of Science, the American Philosophical Society, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He was also Pitt Professor at Cambridge University and Distinguished Honorary Professor at the Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences in China. Died in March 2002 of adult respiratory distress syndrome.
Blau was interested in building a theoretical bridge that would link sociological studies of everyday interactions between individuals and those that examined the collectivist or structural dimensions of society, such as economic systems, political institutions, or belief systems.
exchange theory - is a social psychological and sociological perspective that explains social change and stability as a process of negotiated exchanges between parties. Social exchange theory posits that all human relationships are formed by the use of a subjective cost-benefit analysis and the comparison of alternatives. The theory has roots in economics, psychology and sociology.
Blau stressed the significance of rewards in inducing others to acceded to ones wishes. For Blau, then, an individual is able to exercise power over others when he alone is able to supply needed rewards to them. If the others are unable to receive the benefits from another source, and if they are unable to offer rewards to the individual, they become dependent on the individual. Their only option is to submit to his demands lest he withdraw the needed benefits. In short, power results from an unequal exchange stemming from an individuals or groups monopoly over a desired resource (456).
In defining power in terms of an inequality of resources and the submission that an imbalanced exchange imposes, Blau is led to consider the processes that shape the exercise of power and the rise of opposition to it. These processes, in turn, account for both stability and change in interpersonal and group relations, as well as in more complex social institutions. Of central importance is the role of social norms of fairness and the legitimacy they either confer on or deny those in dominant positions (456).
extrinsic rewards – are “detachable” from the association in which they are acquired. In other words, extrinsic benefits are derived not from another’s company itself, but from the external rewards his company will provide. Here, associating with others serves as a means to a further end. Thus, a salesperson is considerate because she wants to make a commission, not because she values the relationship she initiates with any particular customer (461).
intrinsic rewards – are those things we find pleasurable in and of themselves, not because they provide the means for obtaining other benefits. Examples of intrinsic rewards are celebrating a holiday with one’s family, going on a walk with a friend, or love—the purest type of intrinsic reward. In cases such as these, rewards express ones commitment to the relationship and are exchanged in the interest of maintaining it (461).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/blau.doc
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 454-473
Professor at the University of Chicago then Columbia University. President of American Sociological Association 1973. Senior Fellow at Kings College, Fellow of the National Academy of Science, the American Philosophical Society, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He was also Pitt Professor at Cambridge University and Distinguished Honorary Professor at the Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences in China. Died in March 2002 of adult respiratory distress syndrome.
Blau was interested in building a theoretical bridge that would link sociological studies of everyday interactions between individuals and those that examined the collectivist or structural dimensions of society, such as economic systems, political institutions, or belief systems.
exchange theory - is a social psychological and sociological perspective that explains social change and stability as a process of negotiated exchanges between parties. Social exchange theory posits that all human relationships are formed by the use of a subjective cost-benefit analysis and the comparison of alternatives. The theory has roots in economics, psychology and sociology.
Blau stressed the significance of rewards in inducing others to acceded to ones wishes. For Blau, then, an individual is able to exercise power over others when he alone is able to supply needed rewards to them. If the others are unable to receive the benefits from another source, and if they are unable to offer rewards to the individual, they become dependent on the individual. Their only option is to submit to his demands lest he withdraw the needed benefits. In short, power results from an unequal exchange stemming from an individuals or groups monopoly over a desired resource (456).
In defining power in terms of an inequality of resources and the submission that an imbalanced exchange imposes, Blau is led to consider the processes that shape the exercise of power and the rise of opposition to it. These processes, in turn, account for both stability and change in interpersonal and group relations, as well as in more complex social institutions. Of central importance is the role of social norms of fairness and the legitimacy they either confer on or deny those in dominant positions (456).
extrinsic rewards – are “detachable” from the association in which they are acquired. In other words, extrinsic benefits are derived not from another’s company itself, but from the external rewards his company will provide. Here, associating with others serves as a means to a further end. Thus, a salesperson is considerate because she wants to make a commission, not because she values the relationship she initiates with any particular customer (461).
intrinsic rewards – are those things we find pleasurable in and of themselves, not because they provide the means for obtaining other benefits. Examples of intrinsic rewards are celebrating a holiday with one’s family, going on a walk with a friend, or love—the purest type of intrinsic reward. In cases such as these, rewards express ones commitment to the relationship and are exchanged in the interest of maintaining it (461).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/blau.doc
Study Guide 1 - Test 1/28/10
Part I: Essay Questions
1. Discuss the relationship between classical and contemporary sociological/social theories.
2. Explain how Robert K. Merton reconstructed structural functionalism.
3. Outline the fundamental features of Middle Range Theories.
4. Discuss the cause of deviance and its multiple forms.
5. Explain Merton’s typology of the patterns of prejudice and discrimination.
6. Outline the fundamentals themes in Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical theory.
7. What are total institutions and in what sense do they differ from civil society?
8. How does exchange theory differ from symbolic interactionism?
Part II: Concepts
Robert K. Merton
Structural Functionalism; Parsons and Merton; Functional Analysis; Grand Theory; Protestant Pietism; Middle Range Theories; Dysfunction; Manifest and Latent Functions; Functional Alternatives; Anomie and Deviance; Conformity; Innovation; Ritualism; Retreatism; Rebellion; Self-fulfilling Prophesy; Scientific and Democratic Ethos; The Mathew Effect; Status Sets and Role Sets; Opportunity Structures; Anticipatory Socialization; Reference Groups
Erving Goffman
Goffman and Symbolic Interactionism; Definition of the situation; Goffman; Durkheim, Radcliff-Brown and W. Lloyd Warner; Dramaturgy; Presentation of the Self (Book); Demeanor; Deference; Gender Advertisement; Impression Management; Front and Back Stages; Team; Two-selves Thesis (performer and character); Total Institutions; Analytical Ethnography; Civil Death; Situational Withdrawal; Intransigent Line; Colonization; Conversion
Peter Berger, & Luckman
Lifeworld; Bracketting; Intersubjectivity; Stocks of Knowledge; Recipes and Typifications; Habituation; Institutionalization; Externalization, Objectification; Reification; Internalization; Primary Socialization; Secondary Socialization; Cost; Elementary Social Behavior; Distributive Justice; Power; Imbalanced Exchange; Extrinsic Rewards, Intrinsic Rewards
1. Discuss the relationship between classical and contemporary sociological/social theories.
2. Explain how Robert K. Merton reconstructed structural functionalism.
3. Outline the fundamental features of Middle Range Theories.
4. Discuss the cause of deviance and its multiple forms.
5. Explain Merton’s typology of the patterns of prejudice and discrimination.
6. Outline the fundamentals themes in Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical theory.
7. What are total institutions and in what sense do they differ from civil society?
8. How does exchange theory differ from symbolic interactionism?
Part II: Concepts
Robert K. Merton
Structural Functionalism; Parsons and Merton; Functional Analysis; Grand Theory; Protestant Pietism; Middle Range Theories; Dysfunction; Manifest and Latent Functions; Functional Alternatives; Anomie and Deviance; Conformity; Innovation; Ritualism; Retreatism; Rebellion; Self-fulfilling Prophesy; Scientific and Democratic Ethos; The Mathew Effect; Status Sets and Role Sets; Opportunity Structures; Anticipatory Socialization; Reference Groups
Erving Goffman
Goffman and Symbolic Interactionism; Definition of the situation; Goffman; Durkheim, Radcliff-Brown and W. Lloyd Warner; Dramaturgy; Presentation of the Self (Book); Demeanor; Deference; Gender Advertisement; Impression Management; Front and Back Stages; Team; Two-selves Thesis (performer and character); Total Institutions; Analytical Ethnography; Civil Death; Situational Withdrawal; Intransigent Line; Colonization; Conversion
Peter Berger, & Luckman
Lifeworld; Bracketting; Intersubjectivity; Stocks of Knowledge; Recipes and Typifications; Habituation; Institutionalization; Externalization, Objectification; Reification; Internalization; Primary Socialization; Secondary Socialization; Cost; Elementary Social Behavior; Distributive Justice; Power; Imbalanced Exchange; Extrinsic Rewards, Intrinsic Rewards
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
1/19/10 Class Notes
Goffman - Contemporary Social Theory
I. Total Institutions (social controlled)
a. “mortification of the self” – death – constrained – sleep, work, and play – “immediate companion”
II. Civil Death – Total Taken = Civil Society
III. Strategies of Resistance
a. Two groups – power distinction
b. Situational withdrawal
c. Intransigent Line – Act of Refusal – say no to the authority.
IV. Colonization
a. form of assimilation
b. identifies with the total institution
V. Conversion
a. Inmates accepts institutional ideology
b. Re-socialization has taken place (education)
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/1~19~10.doc
I. Total Institutions (social controlled)
a. “mortification of the self” – death – constrained – sleep, work, and play – “immediate companion”
II. Civil Death – Total Taken = Civil Society
III. Strategies of Resistance
a. Two groups – power distinction
b. Situational withdrawal
c. Intransigent Line – Act of Refusal – say no to the authority.
IV. Colonization
a. form of assimilation
b. identifies with the total institution
V. Conversion
a. Inmates accepts institutional ideology
b. Re-socialization has taken place (education)
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/1~19~10.doc
Thursday, January 14, 2010
1/14/10 Class Notes
I. Erving Goffman – Reconstructing Past Social Theory
a. Civil inattention – not interrupting in order for a smooth performance.
b. Symbolic Interactionism (micro-oriented) - Dramaturgy
c. Dramaturgy – self and society
II. Life resembles drama (similarity)
a. Actors
b. Performance
c. Stages
d. Audience
III. Life resembles drama (differences)
a. Script – Improvisation (Mead) I (creative) and Me (social)
b. Stage – it’s controlled
IV. Spill over effect
V. Self and Society
a. Front stage/Back stage
b. Front is where the actual performance is carried out while the back stage is where the social space prepare themselves for the performance.
VI. Outside (non-stage)
a. Example: no preparation for stage (no one around including self)
VII. “Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life” – Goffman’s Book
a. Presentation of Self – Image (everyday life)
b. Impression Management – Politics (more strategic and deliberate)
VIII. Strategies of Impression Management
a. Idealization – performing the “ideal.”
b. Mystification – this is about social distance – social distance has to be maintained in between the actor and the audience.
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/1~14~10.doc
a. Civil inattention – not interrupting in order for a smooth performance.
b. Symbolic Interactionism (micro-oriented) - Dramaturgy
c. Dramaturgy – self and society
II. Life resembles drama (similarity)
a. Actors
b. Performance
c. Stages
d. Audience
III. Life resembles drama (differences)
a. Script – Improvisation (Mead) I (creative) and Me (social)
b. Stage – it’s controlled
IV. Spill over effect
V. Self and Society
a. Front stage/Back stage
b. Front is where the actual performance is carried out while the back stage is where the social space prepare themselves for the performance.
VI. Outside (non-stage)
a. Example: no preparation for stage (no one around including self)
VII. “Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life” – Goffman’s Book
a. Presentation of Self – Image (everyday life)
b. Impression Management – Politics (more strategic and deliberate)
VIII. Strategies of Impression Management
a. Idealization – performing the “ideal.”
b. Mystification – this is about social distance – social distance has to be maintained in between the actor and the audience.
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/1~14~10.doc
Erving Goffman
DRAMATURGY
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 478-518
Goffman’s books include: Asylums, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Encounters, Behavior in Public Places, Stigma, Interaction Ritual, Strategic Interaction, Frame Analysis, and Gender Advertisements. Article: “The Interaction Order.”
Goffman was considered a symbolic interactionist (for good reason), although Goffman himself found the label wanting. Denying an allegiance to that tradition or even to the more general label of “theorist,” he was more prone to refer to himself as simply an “empiricist” or a “social psychologist.” In some respects, Goffman’s self-description may be the more accurate, for his work drew from a number of distinct approaches that he fashioned together in forming his own novel account of everyday life.
Goffman wrote with the flair of a literary stylist, his was not the dry prose all too common among scientist. Instead of adopting the standard practice of situating ones analyses within a particular intellectual lineage or reigning contemporary debates, Goffman was busy inventing his own terminology, as he set out to “raise questions that no one else had ever asked and to look at data that no one had ever examined before.”
Goffman was at the forefront of important movements within sociology, for instance, doing ethnomethodology before the ethnomethodologist and exploring the central role of language in social life (the “linguistic turn”) well ahead of most of his sociological brethren.
dramaturgy - a sociological perspective stemming from symbolic interactionism.
impression management – is the process through which people try to control the impressions other people form of them. It is a goal-directed conscious or unconscious attempt to influence the perceptions of other people about a person, object or event by regulating and controlling information in social interaction. It is usually used synonymously with self-presentation, if a person tries to influence the perception of their image (480).
definition of the situation – closely related to Goffman’s impression management - The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life is a seminal sociology book by Erving Goffman. It uses the imagery of the theatre in order to portray the importance of human – namely, social – action. The book was published in 1959.
In the center of the analysis lies the relationship between performance and front stage. Unlike other writers who have used this metaphor, Goffman seems to take all elements of acting into consideration: an actor performs on a setting which is constructed of a stage and a backstage; the props at either setting direct his action; he is being watched by an audience, but at the same time he is an audience for his viewers' play.
According to Goffman, the social actor has the ability to choose his stage and props, as well as the costume he would put on in front of a specific audience. The actor's main goal is to keep his coherence, and adjust to the different settings offered him. This is done mainly through interaction with other actors. To a certain extent, this imagery bridges structure and agency, enabling each, while saying that structure and agency can limit each other.
A major theme that Goffman treats throughout the work is the fundamental importance of having an agreed upon definition of the situation in a given interaction, in order to give the interaction coherency. In interactions, or performances, the involved parties may be audience members and performers simultaneously; the actors usually foster impressions that reflect well upon themselves, and encourage the others, by various means, to accept their preferred definition. Goffman acknowledges that when the accepted definition of the situation has been discredited, some or all of the actors may pretend that nothing has changed, if they find this strategy profitable to themselves or wish to keep the peace. For example, when a lady who is attending a formal dinner—and who is certainly striving to present herself positively—trips, nearby party-goers may pretend not to have seen her fumble; they assist her in maintaining face. Goffman avers that this type of artificial, willed credulity happens on every level of social organization, from top to bottom (481).
Goffman illuminated the significance of seemingly insignificant acts. Of particular import are a person’s demeanor (conduct, dress) and the deference (honor, dignity, respect) it symbolically accords to others. By expressing oneself to be a well or poorly demeaned person, an individual simultaneously bestows or withholds deference to others. The reciprocal nature of deference and demeanor is such that maintaining a well-demeaned image allows those present to do likewise as the deference they receive obligates them to confer proper deference in kind. Each is rewarded for his or her good behavior by the deference that person reaps in turn. Yet, whether or not an individual is judged to be well demeaned is determined not by the individual himself but, rather, by the interpretations others make of his behavior during interaction. Indeed, claiming oneself to be well demeaned is a sign of poor demeanor (484).
front – that part of the individual’s performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance. Front, then, is the expressive equipment of a standard kind intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance (486).
backstage – the region of the performance normally unobserved by, and restricted from, members of the audience. Backstage is where the impression fostered by a performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course where illusions and impression are openly constructed. Here costumes and other parts of the personal front may be adjusted and scrutinized for flaws. Here the performer can relax; he can drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character (487).
Goffman draws a distinction between the self as performer and as character, and in doing so he comes to a radical antipsychological conclusion. As a character, the self is not an organic thing that has specific location, whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is whether it will be credited or discredited.
In other words, the self is in reality an image, a managed impression that is fabricated in concert with others during an encounter. While we typically see ones performed self as “something housed within the body of possessor, in the psychobiology of the personality,” in actuality the self is imputed by others such that it “does not derive from its possessor but from the whole scene of his action. This imputation, this self, is a product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it.”
Goffman sums up his notion of self as character thusly: In analyzing the self, we are drawn from its possessor, from the person who will profit or lose most by it, for he and his body merely provide the peg on which something of collaborative manufacture will be hung for a time. And the means for production and maintaining selves do not reside inside the peg; in fact these means are often bolted down in social establishments (488).
merchant of morality – in the capacity of performers, individuals will be concerned with maintaining the impression that they are living up to the many standards by which they and their products are judged. Because these standards are so numerous and so pervasive, the individuals who are performers dwell more than we might think in a moral world. But qua performers, individuals are concerned not with the moral issue of realizing these standards, but with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing impression that these standards are realized. Our activity, then, is largely concerned with moral matters, but as performers we do not have a moral concern with them. As performers we are merchants of morality. The very obligation and profitability of appearing always is a steady moral light, of being a socialized character, forces one to be the sort of person who is practiced in the ways of the stage (490).
total institutions – mental hospitals, prisons, monasteries, convents, the military, and boarding schools all have one thing in common: they are all total institutions – places of “residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.” It is here where “under one roof and according to one rational plan, all spheres of individuals’ lives – sleeping, eating, playing, and working are regulated. To one degree or another, inhabitants of such facilities are stripped of the freedoms and resources to manage their self-presentation that are normally provided by social arrangements. As a result, they are subjected to mortifications of self, processes of “killing off” the multiple selves possessed prior to ones entrance into the total institution and replacing them with one totalizing identity over which the person exercises little, if any, control. Here is the life of the prison inmate or military recruit: shaven head dressed in institutional clothing, substitution of a number or insult for ones name, disposed of personal property, endless degradation, and complete loss of privacy over intimate information and matters of personal hygiene. All work together to construct a self radically different from the one that entered the establishment (506).
secondary adjustments – are “ways in which the individual stands apart from the role and the self that were taken for granted for him by the institution.” They are oppositional practices through which we refuse the “official” view of what we should be and thus distance ourselves from an organization (507).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/goffman.doc
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 478-518
Goffman’s books include: Asylums, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Encounters, Behavior in Public Places, Stigma, Interaction Ritual, Strategic Interaction, Frame Analysis, and Gender Advertisements. Article: “The Interaction Order.”
Goffman was considered a symbolic interactionist (for good reason), although Goffman himself found the label wanting. Denying an allegiance to that tradition or even to the more general label of “theorist,” he was more prone to refer to himself as simply an “empiricist” or a “social psychologist.” In some respects, Goffman’s self-description may be the more accurate, for his work drew from a number of distinct approaches that he fashioned together in forming his own novel account of everyday life.
Goffman wrote with the flair of a literary stylist, his was not the dry prose all too common among scientist. Instead of adopting the standard practice of situating ones analyses within a particular intellectual lineage or reigning contemporary debates, Goffman was busy inventing his own terminology, as he set out to “raise questions that no one else had ever asked and to look at data that no one had ever examined before.”
Goffman was at the forefront of important movements within sociology, for instance, doing ethnomethodology before the ethnomethodologist and exploring the central role of language in social life (the “linguistic turn”) well ahead of most of his sociological brethren.
dramaturgy - a sociological perspective stemming from symbolic interactionism.
impression management – is the process through which people try to control the impressions other people form of them. It is a goal-directed conscious or unconscious attempt to influence the perceptions of other people about a person, object or event by regulating and controlling information in social interaction. It is usually used synonymously with self-presentation, if a person tries to influence the perception of their image (480).
definition of the situation – closely related to Goffman’s impression management - The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life is a seminal sociology book by Erving Goffman. It uses the imagery of the theatre in order to portray the importance of human – namely, social – action. The book was published in 1959.
In the center of the analysis lies the relationship between performance and front stage. Unlike other writers who have used this metaphor, Goffman seems to take all elements of acting into consideration: an actor performs on a setting which is constructed of a stage and a backstage; the props at either setting direct his action; he is being watched by an audience, but at the same time he is an audience for his viewers' play.
According to Goffman, the social actor has the ability to choose his stage and props, as well as the costume he would put on in front of a specific audience. The actor's main goal is to keep his coherence, and adjust to the different settings offered him. This is done mainly through interaction with other actors. To a certain extent, this imagery bridges structure and agency, enabling each, while saying that structure and agency can limit each other.
A major theme that Goffman treats throughout the work is the fundamental importance of having an agreed upon definition of the situation in a given interaction, in order to give the interaction coherency. In interactions, or performances, the involved parties may be audience members and performers simultaneously; the actors usually foster impressions that reflect well upon themselves, and encourage the others, by various means, to accept their preferred definition. Goffman acknowledges that when the accepted definition of the situation has been discredited, some or all of the actors may pretend that nothing has changed, if they find this strategy profitable to themselves or wish to keep the peace. For example, when a lady who is attending a formal dinner—and who is certainly striving to present herself positively—trips, nearby party-goers may pretend not to have seen her fumble; they assist her in maintaining face. Goffman avers that this type of artificial, willed credulity happens on every level of social organization, from top to bottom (481).
Goffman illuminated the significance of seemingly insignificant acts. Of particular import are a person’s demeanor (conduct, dress) and the deference (honor, dignity, respect) it symbolically accords to others. By expressing oneself to be a well or poorly demeaned person, an individual simultaneously bestows or withholds deference to others. The reciprocal nature of deference and demeanor is such that maintaining a well-demeaned image allows those present to do likewise as the deference they receive obligates them to confer proper deference in kind. Each is rewarded for his or her good behavior by the deference that person reaps in turn. Yet, whether or not an individual is judged to be well demeaned is determined not by the individual himself but, rather, by the interpretations others make of his behavior during interaction. Indeed, claiming oneself to be well demeaned is a sign of poor demeanor (484).
front – that part of the individual’s performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance. Front, then, is the expressive equipment of a standard kind intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance (486).
backstage – the region of the performance normally unobserved by, and restricted from, members of the audience. Backstage is where the impression fostered by a performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course where illusions and impression are openly constructed. Here costumes and other parts of the personal front may be adjusted and scrutinized for flaws. Here the performer can relax; he can drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character (487).
Goffman draws a distinction between the self as performer and as character, and in doing so he comes to a radical antipsychological conclusion. As a character, the self is not an organic thing that has specific location, whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is whether it will be credited or discredited.
In other words, the self is in reality an image, a managed impression that is fabricated in concert with others during an encounter. While we typically see ones performed self as “something housed within the body of possessor, in the psychobiology of the personality,” in actuality the self is imputed by others such that it “does not derive from its possessor but from the whole scene of his action. This imputation, this self, is a product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it.”
Goffman sums up his notion of self as character thusly: In analyzing the self, we are drawn from its possessor, from the person who will profit or lose most by it, for he and his body merely provide the peg on which something of collaborative manufacture will be hung for a time. And the means for production and maintaining selves do not reside inside the peg; in fact these means are often bolted down in social establishments (488).
merchant of morality – in the capacity of performers, individuals will be concerned with maintaining the impression that they are living up to the many standards by which they and their products are judged. Because these standards are so numerous and so pervasive, the individuals who are performers dwell more than we might think in a moral world. But qua performers, individuals are concerned not with the moral issue of realizing these standards, but with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing impression that these standards are realized. Our activity, then, is largely concerned with moral matters, but as performers we do not have a moral concern with them. As performers we are merchants of morality. The very obligation and profitability of appearing always is a steady moral light, of being a socialized character, forces one to be the sort of person who is practiced in the ways of the stage (490).
total institutions – mental hospitals, prisons, monasteries, convents, the military, and boarding schools all have one thing in common: they are all total institutions – places of “residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.” It is here where “under one roof and according to one rational plan, all spheres of individuals’ lives – sleeping, eating, playing, and working are regulated. To one degree or another, inhabitants of such facilities are stripped of the freedoms and resources to manage their self-presentation that are normally provided by social arrangements. As a result, they are subjected to mortifications of self, processes of “killing off” the multiple selves possessed prior to ones entrance into the total institution and replacing them with one totalizing identity over which the person exercises little, if any, control. Here is the life of the prison inmate or military recruit: shaven head dressed in institutional clothing, substitution of a number or insult for ones name, disposed of personal property, endless degradation, and complete loss of privacy over intimate information and matters of personal hygiene. All work together to construct a self radically different from the one that entered the establishment (506).
secondary adjustments – are “ways in which the individual stands apart from the role and the self that were taken for granted for him by the institution.” They are oppositional practices through which we refuse the “official” view of what we should be and thus distance ourselves from an organization (507).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/goffman.doc
Peter Berger/Thomas Luckman
PHENOMENOLOGY
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 553-578
Phenomenology - A philosophy or method of inquiry based on the premise that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness and not of anything independent of human consciousness.
Berger and Luckmann’s famous assertion that “society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product.”
From Fehlen and Plessner, Berger and Luckmann borrow the idea that humans, unlike other animals, are “instinctually deprived” or biology underdeveloped. Important organismic developments that take place in the womb in other animals take place in humans’ first year of life. This means not only the survival of the human infant is dependent on certain social arrangements, but that lacking an instinctual basis for action, human beings have to create a world that ensures social stability. Common-sense knowledge and social institutions compensate for biological underdevelopment. They provide a “base” that operates “automatically” (analogous to the instincts that guide other animals’ behavior). “Commonsense knowledge is the knowledge that I share with others in the normal, self-evident routines of everyday life.” It is what allows us to perceive the reality of everyday life as “reality,” to suspend our doubts so that we can act in the world. Social institutions are the bridges between humans and their physical environments. Following Schutz, Berger and Luckmann emphasize that it is the intersubjective character of common-sense knowledge that enables human institutions and culture to produce stability. It is because “most of the time, my encounters with others in everyday life are typical in a double sense—I apprehend the other as a type and I interact with him in a situation that is itself typical” that social interaction is successful. Without intersubjectivity—that you know that I know that we both know—social order and interaction would break down, as we would be left to doubt the most fundamental aspects of communication (554-5).
Luckmann’s first major sole-authored publication, The Invisible Religion (original title Das problem der Religion, 1963). Did not appear in English until the year after the publication of Berger and Luckmann’s groundbreaking The Social Construction of Reality (1966), and he never became quite as well known in the United States as either his teacher, Alfred Schutz, or his collaborator, Peter Berger. Luckmann’s “unequal” relationship with Schutz is duly noted by Luckmann himself in the preface to The Structures of the Life World (Schutz and Luckmann 1973), which he finished editing after Schutz’s death (554).
Berger was a fervent student of religion. He continuously contemplated his own Christian beliefs and spent a “very happy” year at the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, where he studied to be a minister. Indeed, Berger is just as well known for his work in the sociology of religion as in phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge. His now-classic Invitation to Sociology (1963) continues to be one of the most acclaimed and inspiring introductions to the discipline of sociology today (553).
habitualization - the process by which the flexibility of human actions is limited. All activity is subject to habitualization, as repeated actions inevitably become rountinized. Habitualization carries with it the psychological advantage that choices are narrowed. Hat an action may be “performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort” provides a stable back-ground from which human activity can proceed. In other words, from the time we wake up in the morning until we go to bed at night, we can direct our minds and bodies to constructive action only because we take most actions for granted (555).
habitualization actions set the stage for institutionalization, for “institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized action by types of actors.” That is, it is when habitualized action are shared and/or “available to all members of the particular social group” that institutions are born. Akin to habits that function at the level of the individual, then, institutions are not created instantaneously, but rather are “built up in the course of a shared history. In other words, over times, shared habitualized actions become institutions that are taken for granted and therefore limiting for the individuals who are subject to them. Thus, it is through institutions that human life becomes coherent, meaningful, and continuous (555).
Berger and Luckmann use the terms externalization, objectivation, and reification to refer to the process by which human activity and society attain the character of objectivity. Externalization and objectivation enable the actor to confront the social world as something outside herself. Institutions appear external to the individual, as historical and objective facticities. They confront the individual as undeniable facts. Reification is “an extreme step” in process of objectivation. In reification, “the real relationship between man and his world is reversed in consciousness. Man, the producer of a world, is apprehended as its product, and human activity as an epiphenome-non of non-human process.” That is, reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were “non-human or possibly suprahuman” things. For instance, we reify our social roles in such a way that we say, “I have no choice in the matter. I have to act this way.” That is what Berger refers to as “bad faith.” Of course, history is full of examples of the horrendous consequences that ensue from such reification. The Nazi concentration camps relied on guards who are said to have merely “taken orders.” A parallel also can be drawn with the recent example of torture in the Abu Ghraib prison (556).
internalization – is “the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning,” that is, the process through which individual subjectivity is attained. Internalization means that “the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization.” As such, internalization is the “beginning point” in the process of becoming a member of society, as well as the “end point” in institutionalization. The three moment s of externalization, objectivation, and internalization are not to be understood “as occurring in a temporal sequence,” but rather as a simultaneous, dialectical process. Nevertheless, it is in intergenerational transmission that the process of internalization is complete. As Berger and Luckmann maintain:
only with the transmission of the social world to a new generation (that is, internalization as effectuated in socialization) does the fundamental social dialectic appear in its totality. To repeat, only with the appearance of a new generation can one properly speak of a social world.
In other words, every individual is born into an environment within which she encounters the significant others who are in charge of her socialization. One does not choose one’s own significant others; rather, they are imposed on her. In the process of socialization, the stocks of knowledge that the individual experiences as preexisting objective reality are imposed on her. The individual is thereby “born into not only an objective social structure but also an objective social world (558).”
Berger and Luckmann differentiate two types of socialization based on the extent to which individuals are active and conscious of the process of internalization. Primary socialization refers to “the first socialization an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society.” On the other hand, secondary socialization refers to subsequent processes of socialization that induct “an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of this society.” Whereas primary socialization is predefined and taken for granted, secondary socialization is acquired in a more conscious way. It is for this reason that primary socialization has so much more of an impact on the individual than secondary socialization. As Berger and Luckmann state:
The child does not internalize the world of his significant others as one of many possible worlds. He internalized it as the world, the only existent and only conceivable world, the world tout court. It is for this reason that the world internalized in primary socialization is so much more firmly entrenched in consciousness than worlds internalized in secondary socialization.
Furthermore, primary socialization is distinguished by the fact that it cannot take place without an emotionally shared identification of the children with his significant others: you have to love your mother, but not your teacher. This distinction between the more intimate (primary) and less intimate (secondary) types of socialization recalls Schutz’s more abstract discussion of umwelt versus mitwelt relations. Each type of relationship is distinguished by a different level of intersubjectivity and typification. Primary socialization and significant others (essential to “we relations”) are far more central to the maintenance of “identity” than are secondary relationships/socialization (558).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/berger~luckman.doc
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 553-578
Phenomenology - A philosophy or method of inquiry based on the premise that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness and not of anything independent of human consciousness.
Berger and Luckmann’s famous assertion that “society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product.”
From Fehlen and Plessner, Berger and Luckmann borrow the idea that humans, unlike other animals, are “instinctually deprived” or biology underdeveloped. Important organismic developments that take place in the womb in other animals take place in humans’ first year of life. This means not only the survival of the human infant is dependent on certain social arrangements, but that lacking an instinctual basis for action, human beings have to create a world that ensures social stability. Common-sense knowledge and social institutions compensate for biological underdevelopment. They provide a “base” that operates “automatically” (analogous to the instincts that guide other animals’ behavior). “Commonsense knowledge is the knowledge that I share with others in the normal, self-evident routines of everyday life.” It is what allows us to perceive the reality of everyday life as “reality,” to suspend our doubts so that we can act in the world. Social institutions are the bridges between humans and their physical environments. Following Schutz, Berger and Luckmann emphasize that it is the intersubjective character of common-sense knowledge that enables human institutions and culture to produce stability. It is because “most of the time, my encounters with others in everyday life are typical in a double sense—I apprehend the other as a type and I interact with him in a situation that is itself typical” that social interaction is successful. Without intersubjectivity—that you know that I know that we both know—social order and interaction would break down, as we would be left to doubt the most fundamental aspects of communication (554-5).
Luckmann’s first major sole-authored publication, The Invisible Religion (original title Das problem der Religion, 1963). Did not appear in English until the year after the publication of Berger and Luckmann’s groundbreaking The Social Construction of Reality (1966), and he never became quite as well known in the United States as either his teacher, Alfred Schutz, or his collaborator, Peter Berger. Luckmann’s “unequal” relationship with Schutz is duly noted by Luckmann himself in the preface to The Structures of the Life World (Schutz and Luckmann 1973), which he finished editing after Schutz’s death (554).
Berger was a fervent student of religion. He continuously contemplated his own Christian beliefs and spent a “very happy” year at the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, where he studied to be a minister. Indeed, Berger is just as well known for his work in the sociology of religion as in phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge. His now-classic Invitation to Sociology (1963) continues to be one of the most acclaimed and inspiring introductions to the discipline of sociology today (553).
habitualization - the process by which the flexibility of human actions is limited. All activity is subject to habitualization, as repeated actions inevitably become rountinized. Habitualization carries with it the psychological advantage that choices are narrowed. Hat an action may be “performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort” provides a stable back-ground from which human activity can proceed. In other words, from the time we wake up in the morning until we go to bed at night, we can direct our minds and bodies to constructive action only because we take most actions for granted (555).
habitualization actions set the stage for institutionalization, for “institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized action by types of actors.” That is, it is when habitualized action are shared and/or “available to all members of the particular social group” that institutions are born. Akin to habits that function at the level of the individual, then, institutions are not created instantaneously, but rather are “built up in the course of a shared history. In other words, over times, shared habitualized actions become institutions that are taken for granted and therefore limiting for the individuals who are subject to them. Thus, it is through institutions that human life becomes coherent, meaningful, and continuous (555).
Berger and Luckmann use the terms externalization, objectivation, and reification to refer to the process by which human activity and society attain the character of objectivity. Externalization and objectivation enable the actor to confront the social world as something outside herself. Institutions appear external to the individual, as historical and objective facticities. They confront the individual as undeniable facts. Reification is “an extreme step” in process of objectivation. In reification, “the real relationship between man and his world is reversed in consciousness. Man, the producer of a world, is apprehended as its product, and human activity as an epiphenome-non of non-human process.” That is, reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were “non-human or possibly suprahuman” things. For instance, we reify our social roles in such a way that we say, “I have no choice in the matter. I have to act this way.” That is what Berger refers to as “bad faith.” Of course, history is full of examples of the horrendous consequences that ensue from such reification. The Nazi concentration camps relied on guards who are said to have merely “taken orders.” A parallel also can be drawn with the recent example of torture in the Abu Ghraib prison (556).
internalization – is “the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning,” that is, the process through which individual subjectivity is attained. Internalization means that “the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization.” As such, internalization is the “beginning point” in the process of becoming a member of society, as well as the “end point” in institutionalization. The three moment s of externalization, objectivation, and internalization are not to be understood “as occurring in a temporal sequence,” but rather as a simultaneous, dialectical process. Nevertheless, it is in intergenerational transmission that the process of internalization is complete. As Berger and Luckmann maintain:
only with the transmission of the social world to a new generation (that is, internalization as effectuated in socialization) does the fundamental social dialectic appear in its totality. To repeat, only with the appearance of a new generation can one properly speak of a social world.
In other words, every individual is born into an environment within which she encounters the significant others who are in charge of her socialization. One does not choose one’s own significant others; rather, they are imposed on her. In the process of socialization, the stocks of knowledge that the individual experiences as preexisting objective reality are imposed on her. The individual is thereby “born into not only an objective social structure but also an objective social world (558).”
Berger and Luckmann differentiate two types of socialization based on the extent to which individuals are active and conscious of the process of internalization. Primary socialization refers to “the first socialization an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society.” On the other hand, secondary socialization refers to subsequent processes of socialization that induct “an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of this society.” Whereas primary socialization is predefined and taken for granted, secondary socialization is acquired in a more conscious way. It is for this reason that primary socialization has so much more of an impact on the individual than secondary socialization. As Berger and Luckmann state:
The child does not internalize the world of his significant others as one of many possible worlds. He internalized it as the world, the only existent and only conceivable world, the world tout court. It is for this reason that the world internalized in primary socialization is so much more firmly entrenched in consciousness than worlds internalized in secondary socialization.
Furthermore, primary socialization is distinguished by the fact that it cannot take place without an emotionally shared identification of the children with his significant others: you have to love your mother, but not your teacher. This distinction between the more intimate (primary) and less intimate (secondary) types of socialization recalls Schutz’s more abstract discussion of umwelt versus mitwelt relations. Each type of relationship is distinguished by a different level of intersubjectivity and typification. Primary socialization and significant others (essential to “we relations”) are far more central to the maintenance of “identity” than are secondary relationships/socialization (558).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/berger~luckman.doc
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
1/12/10 Class Notes
January 12, 2010
*term “liberal” is open minded and not bound by some form of thought
I. Merton – Middle Range Theory—Deviance
a. Meso approach (middle) because Talbot Parsons theory was too broad.
b. Theory of Deviance – taken the concept of Anomie (Durkheim)—normalness (the absence of norms). Merton took this concept and modified it to suite his purpose to the cause of “the goals and means of society.” Anomie comes when there is an inconsistency or gap in between the goals and the means (++),(--),(+-),(-+).
c. (++) (conformist) has goals and means, example: a college student.
d. (+-) (innovator) deviant behavior—has goals but no means—example: a drug dealer or a robbery.
e. (-+) (ritualist) having goals but having means example: bureaucrat.
f. (--) (retreatist) not interested in the goals or means of society—example: homeless, suicide, recluse or hermit.
g. (--++) (revolutionaries) not interested in the goals or means of society but creates new goals which create new means (not interested in capitalistic society ~ follows rules that are contrasting too the capitalist society.
II. Robert Merton – Patterns of Prejudice and Discrimination
a. Does a person discriminate? Yes or No?
b. Is a person prejudice? Yes or No?
c. Discrimination is an action; prejudice is a perception ~ not ALWAYS an organic link in between the two. In order to discriminate you must have power. Power and discrimination are interconnected.
d. (yy) active bigot – yes discriminate, yes prejudice example: manager who does not hire because of discrimination.
e. (ny) timid bigot - no discrimination, yes prejudice – example: may not have the power to discriminate or afraid of the consequences coming from an institutional power.
f. (yn) fair whether liberal - yes on discrimination, no on prejudice – example: following others—more interested in an end result example: country club or choosing a football team.
g. (nn) all whether liberal – no on discrimination, no on prejudice – example: myself ;o)
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/1~12~10.doc
*term “liberal” is open minded and not bound by some form of thought
I. Merton – Middle Range Theory—Deviance
a. Meso approach (middle) because Talbot Parsons theory was too broad.
b. Theory of Deviance – taken the concept of Anomie (Durkheim)—normalness (the absence of norms). Merton took this concept and modified it to suite his purpose to the cause of “the goals and means of society.” Anomie comes when there is an inconsistency or gap in between the goals and the means (++),(--),(+-),(-+).
c. (++) (conformist) has goals and means, example: a college student.
d. (+-) (innovator) deviant behavior—has goals but no means—example: a drug dealer or a robbery.
e. (-+) (ritualist) having goals but having means example: bureaucrat.
f. (--) (retreatist) not interested in the goals or means of society—example: homeless, suicide, recluse or hermit.
g. (--++) (revolutionaries) not interested in the goals or means of society but creates new goals which create new means (not interested in capitalistic society ~ follows rules that are contrasting too the capitalist society.
II. Robert Merton – Patterns of Prejudice and Discrimination
a. Does a person discriminate? Yes or No?
b. Is a person prejudice? Yes or No?
c. Discrimination is an action; prejudice is a perception ~ not ALWAYS an organic link in between the two. In order to discriminate you must have power. Power and discrimination are interconnected.
d. (yy) active bigot – yes discriminate, yes prejudice example: manager who does not hire because of discrimination.
e. (ny) timid bigot - no discrimination, yes prejudice – example: may not have the power to discriminate or afraid of the consequences coming from an institutional power.
f. (yn) fair whether liberal - yes on discrimination, no on prejudice – example: following others—more interested in an end result example: country club or choosing a football team.
g. (nn) all whether liberal – no on discrimination, no on prejudice – example: myself ;o)
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/1~12~10.doc
Friday, January 8, 2010
Robert K. Merton
STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 382-394
Structural Functionalism - is a broad perspective in the social sciences which addresses social structure in terms of the function of its constituent elements, namely norms, customs, traditions and institutions.
Sociology of Science - "Ethos of science" published, On the Shoulders of Giants - later revised and expanded into Social Theory and Social Structure (382).
Merton's theories include - deviance, drug addiction, friendship formation, medical education, technology, media, and the history of science.
Merton extended Parsons point that society is a system of interrelated parts and reworked it in order to emphasize that the components of the system may or may not be "in sync," and that the results are not always predictable. This pivotal theoretical contribution is readily apparent not only in Merton's highly influential concepts of manifest and latent function and dysfunction, but also in his oft-cited theory of deviance.
(Freud term) Manifest function - refers to the overt or intended purpose of action (388-94).
(Freud term) Latent function (related to human sex drive)- refers to the implicit or unintended purpose. Often reinforces group identity and social ties (388-94).
(Freud term) Oral fixation - gum chewing, fingernail biting, smoking, etc. is related to the "oral" period of child development (0-15 months) in which gratification for the child revolves around nursing, gumming, sucking, and mouth movement. Oral fixation reflects a failure to psychologically complete this stage, the behavior in question being a defense mechanism to avoid the anxiety produced from the conflict of leaving this stage (383).
Merton emphasized that different parts of a system might be at odds with each other and, thus, that even functional or beneficial institutions or sub-systems can produce dysfunctions or unintended consequences as well.
Theory of Deviance - in sociology, deviance refers to modes of action that do not conform to the dominant norms or values in a social group or society. Following the functionalist notion that society is a system of interrelated parts, Merton hypothesized that deviance results when the values of a society are out of sync with the means available for achieving them. For that "success" means having lots of money but is not afforded the opportunity to earn a legitimate, well-paying living. Thus, the individual turns to illegal means (e.g., selling illegal drugs) in order to achieve economic success.
Dysfunction - the concept in which unintended consequences occur because of a disconnect between the cultural and social realms (384).
Role Theory - Role theory is a perspective in sociology and in social psychology that considers most of everyday activity to be the acting out of socially defined categories (e.g., mother, manager, teacher). Each social role is a universe of rights, duties, expectations, norms and behavior a person has to face and to fulfill.
The theory posits the following propositions about social behavior:
1. People spend much of their lives in groups.
2. Within these groups, people often take distinct positions.
3. Each of these positions can be called a role, with a whole set of functions that are molded by the expectations of others.
4. Formalized expectations become norms when enough people feel comfortable in providing punishments and rewards for the expected behavior.
5. People generally conform to their roles.
6. The anticipation of rewards and punishments inspire this conformity.
7. A key insight of this theory is that role conflict occurs when a person is expected to simultaneously act out multiple roles that carry contradictory expectations (385).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/merton.doc
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 382-394
Structural Functionalism - is a broad perspective in the social sciences which addresses social structure in terms of the function of its constituent elements, namely norms, customs, traditions and institutions.
Sociology of Science - "Ethos of science" published, On the Shoulders of Giants - later revised and expanded into Social Theory and Social Structure (382).
Merton's theories include - deviance, drug addiction, friendship formation, medical education, technology, media, and the history of science.
Merton extended Parsons point that society is a system of interrelated parts and reworked it in order to emphasize that the components of the system may or may not be "in sync," and that the results are not always predictable. This pivotal theoretical contribution is readily apparent not only in Merton's highly influential concepts of manifest and latent function and dysfunction, but also in his oft-cited theory of deviance.
(Freud term) Manifest function - refers to the overt or intended purpose of action (388-94).
(Freud term) Latent function (related to human sex drive)- refers to the implicit or unintended purpose. Often reinforces group identity and social ties (388-94).
(Freud term) Oral fixation - gum chewing, fingernail biting, smoking, etc. is related to the "oral" period of child development (0-15 months) in which gratification for the child revolves around nursing, gumming, sucking, and mouth movement. Oral fixation reflects a failure to psychologically complete this stage, the behavior in question being a defense mechanism to avoid the anxiety produced from the conflict of leaving this stage (383).
Merton emphasized that different parts of a system might be at odds with each other and, thus, that even functional or beneficial institutions or sub-systems can produce dysfunctions or unintended consequences as well.
Theory of Deviance - in sociology, deviance refers to modes of action that do not conform to the dominant norms or values in a social group or society. Following the functionalist notion that society is a system of interrelated parts, Merton hypothesized that deviance results when the values of a society are out of sync with the means available for achieving them. For that "success" means having lots of money but is not afforded the opportunity to earn a legitimate, well-paying living. Thus, the individual turns to illegal means (e.g., selling illegal drugs) in order to achieve economic success.
Dysfunction - the concept in which unintended consequences occur because of a disconnect between the cultural and social realms (384).
Role Theory - Role theory is a perspective in sociology and in social psychology that considers most of everyday activity to be the acting out of socially defined categories (e.g., mother, manager, teacher). Each social role is a universe of rights, duties, expectations, norms and behavior a person has to face and to fulfill.
The theory posits the following propositions about social behavior:
1. People spend much of their lives in groups.
2. Within these groups, people often take distinct positions.
3. Each of these positions can be called a role, with a whole set of functions that are molded by the expectations of others.
4. Formalized expectations become norms when enough people feel comfortable in providing punishments and rewards for the expected behavior.
5. People generally conform to their roles.
6. The anticipation of rewards and punishments inspire this conformity.
7. A key insight of this theory is that role conflict occurs when a person is expected to simultaneously act out multiple roles that carry contradictory expectations (385).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/merton.doc
Thursday, January 7, 2010
1/7/10 Class Notes
January 7, 2010
I. Classical and Contemporary Social Theories
a. Connection - There are connection and differences in both Classical and Contemporary Social Theories. The relationship between the two is that Classical Theorists were used in the construction of Contemporary Social Theory. Contemporary Theory is an outcome although there is a separation while still connected to Classical Theory.
b. Separation – Social change causes theory to change, therefore a new set of concepts must be implemented; Classical theory cannot be abandon entirely.
c. Practice – Times change.
d. Dialog - Old concepts are challenged or evolved such as Feminist theory.
II. Robert Merton
a. Neo-functionalist (Talcott Parsons, and American Sociologist) – Structural Functionalism (Parsons determined that each individual has expectations of the other's action and reaction to his own behavior, and that these expectations would (if successful) be "derived" from the accepted norms and values of the society they inhabit. As Parsons himself emphasized, however, in a general context there would never exist any perfect "fit" between behaviors and norms, so such a relation is never complete or "perfect." Social norms were always problematic for Parsons, who never claimed (as has often been alleged) that social norms were generally accepted and agreed upon, should this prevent some kind of universal law. Whether social norms were accepted or not was for Parsons simply a historical question. As behaviors are repeated in more interactions, and these expectations are entrenched or institutionalized, a role is created. Parsons defines a "role" as the normatively-regulated participation "of a person in a concrete process of social interaction with specific, concrete role-partners. Although any individual, theoretically, can fulfill any role, she is expected to conform to the norms governing the nature of the role she fulfils.
b. Macro-Oriented approach is too abstract - Merton has a problem with this because it becomes less scientific. Too broad is a problem because the imperial cannot be tested – less scientific – micro is also not the way to go. Meso-approach (middle range approach). Allows in between the micro and the macro.
c. Function - Social function causes dysfunction. Example: The current banking system – Then we Merton ask, “Functional for whom?” Functional for a male dominated society.
d. Manifest and Latent functions – Manifest is intended while latent is unintended (Parson focused on Manifest (intended). Example: The rain dance – in which individuals dance in order to make rain (manifest) while group solidarity is formed (latent).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/1~7~10.doc
I. Classical and Contemporary Social Theories
a. Connection - There are connection and differences in both Classical and Contemporary Social Theories. The relationship between the two is that Classical Theorists were used in the construction of Contemporary Social Theory. Contemporary Theory is an outcome although there is a separation while still connected to Classical Theory.
b. Separation – Social change causes theory to change, therefore a new set of concepts must be implemented; Classical theory cannot be abandon entirely.
c. Practice – Times change.
d. Dialog - Old concepts are challenged or evolved such as Feminist theory.
II. Robert Merton
a. Neo-functionalist (Talcott Parsons, and American Sociologist) – Structural Functionalism (Parsons determined that each individual has expectations of the other's action and reaction to his own behavior, and that these expectations would (if successful) be "derived" from the accepted norms and values of the society they inhabit. As Parsons himself emphasized, however, in a general context there would never exist any perfect "fit" between behaviors and norms, so such a relation is never complete or "perfect." Social norms were always problematic for Parsons, who never claimed (as has often been alleged) that social norms were generally accepted and agreed upon, should this prevent some kind of universal law. Whether social norms were accepted or not was for Parsons simply a historical question. As behaviors are repeated in more interactions, and these expectations are entrenched or institutionalized, a role is created. Parsons defines a "role" as the normatively-regulated participation "of a person in a concrete process of social interaction with specific, concrete role-partners. Although any individual, theoretically, can fulfill any role, she is expected to conform to the norms governing the nature of the role she fulfils.
b. Macro-Oriented approach is too abstract - Merton has a problem with this because it becomes less scientific. Too broad is a problem because the imperial cannot be tested – less scientific – micro is also not the way to go. Meso-approach (middle range approach). Allows in between the micro and the macro.
c. Function - Social function causes dysfunction. Example: The current banking system – Then we Merton ask, “Functional for whom?” Functional for a male dominated society.
d. Manifest and Latent functions – Manifest is intended while latent is unintended (Parson focused on Manifest (intended). Example: The rain dance – in which individuals dance in order to make rain (manifest) while group solidarity is formed (latent).
http://www.cynthiagilligan.com/sociology/1~7~10.doc
Syllabus
TEXT BOOKS
-Classical and Contemporary Sociological Theory: Text and Readings. Authors: Scott Appelrouth & Laura Desfor Edles. Edition: First. Year of Publication: 2008. Publisher: Pine Forge Press. ISBN # 978-0-7619-2793-8.
-Dictionary of Contemporary Social Theory. Compiled by (with comments): Alem Kebede. (Please note that parts of this teaching material cannot be reproduced or posted on the Internet without the permission of the instructor.)
EXAMNINATIONS, PAPERS, AND GRADING
Grades will be based on three exams (185 points total]), attendance and participation in class (15 points [No attendance points if a student misses three classes, including classes that are not attended in full.]), and a conceptual term paper (100 points). A term paper should not be less than 8 pages, nor should it exceed 12 pages. Guidelines for the term paper will be discussed in class. There will be penalty for not submitting papers on the due date.
Grades will be assigned using the standard grading system: 100-90=A; 89-80=B; 79-70=C; 69-60=D. The final grade for the course will be determined as follows: 300-270=A; 269-240=B; 239=210=C; 209-180=D.
ATTENDANCE
You are required to attend all classes. An absence will be regarded as excused if and and only if verification of the reason for the absence is provided and this reason is such that a) attendance would have been detrimental to the health of the student, b) attendance would have put other students at risk, c) a case of personal emergency or tragedy, or d) the instructor approved the reason for the absence at least one week in advance of the missed class. The instructor will be happy to discuss any aspect of the course with any student during office hours or during a mutually agreed to meeting time. However, it is unprofessional to approach the instructor seeking information that was missed as a result of unexcused absence.
Active participation and attending class on a regular basis can raise your grade in borderline cases. Excessive absence will result in the letter grade of “I” (Incomplete).
CURVES, MAKE-UPS, ETC.
No grading curves or other such means will be employed during the determination of any grades for this course. There will be no extra credit options unless assigned by the instructor following an excused absence. There will be no make-up exam except in cases where an exam was missed due to an excused absence. If an exam is missed as a result of an excused absence, then either a make-up exam will be scheduled, or the weight assigned to other elements in the course will be adjusted.
ACADEMIC DISHONESTY
Any form of academic dishonesty will not be tolerated during this course. It is the responsibility of each student to learn what academic dishonesty includes. The Office of Student Conduct can provide useful information on this topic. The instructor will seek the gravest possible penalty in accordance with CSUB policies and regulations.
SPECIAL NEEDS
Any student with a disability or having special needs should notify both the instructor and the Office of Disabled Student Services as soon as possible. The instructor welcomes any student who wants to discuss issues pertaining to his/her academic progress, ambition, or problem. Just e-mail, or call me, or drop by to my office anytime.
COURSE OUTLINE
Please note that the following outline does not exhaust all the key social theorists that we will be discussing in class. Also the depth of treatment that a particular theorist receives in class depends on the intellectual impact that his/her perspective has on social analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 1-20; Kebede TBA
II. STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM: ROBERT MERTON
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 382-394; Kebede TBA
III. DRAMATURGY: ERVING GOFFMAN
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 478-518; Kebede TBA
IV. EXCHANGE THEORY & PHENOMENOLOGY: PETER BLAU & BERGER AND LUCKMAN
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 454-473; 553-578; Kebede TBA
EXAM I: January 28, 2010
V. CRITICAL THEORY: C. WRIGHT MILLS & JURGEN HABERMAS
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 409; Mills 1-20; Appelrouth & Edles 719-752; Kebede TBA
VI: FEMINST THEORIES: DOROTHY SMITH & PATRICIA HILL COLLINS
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 581-621; Kebede TBA
EXAM II: February 18, 2010
VII. POSTSTRUCTURAL AND POSTMODERN THEORIES: MICHEL FOUCUALT & JEAN BAUDRILLARD
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 632-682; Kebede TBA
VIII. CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL SYNTHESES: ANTHONY GIDDENS & PIERRE BOURDIEU Read: Appelrouth & Edles 684-718; 753-786; Kebede TBA
IX. THE GLOBAL SOCIETY: IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN & EDWARD SAID
Read Appelrouth & Edles 787-837; Kebede TBA
TERM PAPER DUE: March 4, 2010
EXAM III: March 16, 2010
-Classical and Contemporary Sociological Theory: Text and Readings. Authors: Scott Appelrouth & Laura Desfor Edles. Edition: First. Year of Publication: 2008. Publisher: Pine Forge Press. ISBN # 978-0-7619-2793-8.
-Dictionary of Contemporary Social Theory. Compiled by (with comments): Alem Kebede. (Please note that parts of this teaching material cannot be reproduced or posted on the Internet without the permission of the instructor.)
EXAMNINATIONS, PAPERS, AND GRADING
Grades will be based on three exams (185 points total]), attendance and participation in class (15 points [No attendance points if a student misses three classes, including classes that are not attended in full.]), and a conceptual term paper (100 points). A term paper should not be less than 8 pages, nor should it exceed 12 pages. Guidelines for the term paper will be discussed in class. There will be penalty for not submitting papers on the due date.
Grades will be assigned using the standard grading system: 100-90=A; 89-80=B; 79-70=C; 69-60=D. The final grade for the course will be determined as follows: 300-270=A; 269-240=B; 239=210=C; 209-180=D.
ATTENDANCE
You are required to attend all classes. An absence will be regarded as excused if and and only if verification of the reason for the absence is provided and this reason is such that a) attendance would have been detrimental to the health of the student, b) attendance would have put other students at risk, c) a case of personal emergency or tragedy, or d) the instructor approved the reason for the absence at least one week in advance of the missed class. The instructor will be happy to discuss any aspect of the course with any student during office hours or during a mutually agreed to meeting time. However, it is unprofessional to approach the instructor seeking information that was missed as a result of unexcused absence.
Active participation and attending class on a regular basis can raise your grade in borderline cases. Excessive absence will result in the letter grade of “I” (Incomplete).
CURVES, MAKE-UPS, ETC.
No grading curves or other such means will be employed during the determination of any grades for this course. There will be no extra credit options unless assigned by the instructor following an excused absence. There will be no make-up exam except in cases where an exam was missed due to an excused absence. If an exam is missed as a result of an excused absence, then either a make-up exam will be scheduled, or the weight assigned to other elements in the course will be adjusted.
ACADEMIC DISHONESTY
Any form of academic dishonesty will not be tolerated during this course. It is the responsibility of each student to learn what academic dishonesty includes. The Office of Student Conduct can provide useful information on this topic. The instructor will seek the gravest possible penalty in accordance with CSUB policies and regulations.
SPECIAL NEEDS
Any student with a disability or having special needs should notify both the instructor and the Office of Disabled Student Services as soon as possible. The instructor welcomes any student who wants to discuss issues pertaining to his/her academic progress, ambition, or problem. Just e-mail, or call me, or drop by to my office anytime.
COURSE OUTLINE
Please note that the following outline does not exhaust all the key social theorists that we will be discussing in class. Also the depth of treatment that a particular theorist receives in class depends on the intellectual impact that his/her perspective has on social analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 1-20; Kebede TBA
II. STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM: ROBERT MERTON
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 382-394; Kebede TBA
III. DRAMATURGY: ERVING GOFFMAN
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 478-518; Kebede TBA
IV. EXCHANGE THEORY & PHENOMENOLOGY: PETER BLAU & BERGER AND LUCKMAN
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 454-473; 553-578; Kebede TBA
EXAM I: January 28, 2010
V. CRITICAL THEORY: C. WRIGHT MILLS & JURGEN HABERMAS
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 409; Mills 1-20; Appelrouth & Edles 719-752; Kebede TBA
VI: FEMINST THEORIES: DOROTHY SMITH & PATRICIA HILL COLLINS
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 581-621; Kebede TBA
EXAM II: February 18, 2010
VII. POSTSTRUCTURAL AND POSTMODERN THEORIES: MICHEL FOUCUALT & JEAN BAUDRILLARD
Read: Appelrouth & Edles 632-682; Kebede TBA
VIII. CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL SYNTHESES: ANTHONY GIDDENS & PIERRE BOURDIEU Read: Appelrouth & Edles 684-718; 753-786; Kebede TBA
IX. THE GLOBAL SOCIETY: IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN & EDWARD SAID
Read Appelrouth & Edles 787-837; Kebede TBA
TERM PAPER DUE: March 4, 2010
EXAM III: March 16, 2010
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
